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InterviewService & Connectivity1h · 15:01 GMT · 4 min read

When Should Enterprises Use an AI Agent Kill Switch?

As AI agents gain access to enterprise applications, data and workflows, security teams need to decide how they are governed, monitored and stopped. Vonage CISO Andy Ulrich explains why established access controls, logging and incident response remain central to managing the risk

AI agents are moving beyond chat interfaces and into enterprise workflows, where they can access applications, handle internal data and take action on behalf of employees.

That creates a practical question for IT and security teams: when an agent behaves unexpectedly, when should it be stopped?

Andy Ulrich, Chief Information Security Officer at Vonage, told UC Today that organisations do not need an entirely new security playbook for AI. But they do need to apply established security disciplines rigorously as agents become more capable and autonomous.

“AI is controllable, just like any other threat is controllable,” Ulrich said. “You have to start with the basics.”

Those basics include identity and access management, patching, incident response and logging. They have long been central to enterprise security, but AI agents can use systems more quickly and more thoroughly than an individual employee.

Ulrich said organisations should think of an agent as an exceptionally capable employee that may not naturally recognise the limits of internal policies.

“If you consider AI to be an employee who’s super smart, super efficient, super fast, and doesn’t have strong regard for your policies, that’s sort of how we have to think about these AI agents,” he said.

Treating AI Agents as Managed Identities

AI agents can be managed in different ways as businesses test where and how they can safely operate.

Ulrich said organisations may initially want to treat AI as a privileged user, even where the employee deploying the agent would not normally have privileged access. That could give IT and security teams greater oversight while they develop a clearer understanding of agent behaviour.

However, he does not believe that approach is sustainable over the long term.

Instead, Ulrich said organisations should work towards giving an agent the same permissions as the individual responsible for it. Those permissions should then be reviewed through the same processes used for human identities.

“We should be driving towards managing what AI can access in the same way that we manage it for people,” Ulrich said.

That means maintaining visibility over who is responsible for an agent, which applications it can access and why that access has been granted. It also requires regular access reviews, much like those already carried out for employees.

Logging Must Support Security Investigations

The risk grows when an AI agent is assigned a task but does not have the permissions required to complete it. Ulrich said agents may try different routes to achieve their objectives, including seeking ways to gain access they were not originally granted.

Identity and access management is therefore essential, but it is not enough on its own. Organisations must also be able to investigate unexpected activity and identify whether it was caused by the agent, an overly broad permission model, an application issue or malicious activity.

“If you haven’t already seen AI do something unexpected, it’s a matter of time until you do,” Ulrich said.

Logging provides the evidence needed for that work. But Ulrich said security teams must be involved in deciding what events are recorded.

Engineering teams may log information that helps them understand software performance. Security teams, meanwhile, need records that can explain access decisions, unexpected permissions and suspicious activity.

“There has to be a collaboration to agree and have policy on what the right things to log are,” Ulrich said.

That requires balance. Logging every possible event can create significant storage requirements and cost, while insufficient logging can leave teams unable to reconstruct an incident.

When an AI Agent Should Be Suspended

Ulrich said managed AI deployments need the ability to shut an agent down quickly when its behaviour appears risky or outside its intended boundaries.

“There has to be the ability to rapidly shut down an agent,” he said. “You need a kill switch.”

An immediate suspension may be appropriate when an agent appears to be granting access to an identity that should not have it, or when its activity suggests it may be operating beyond the limits intended by the organisation.

The decision to suspend an agent does not automatically mean a security incident has occurred. A team may have misunderstood a signal, and an investigation could find the activity was authorised.

But organisations need to be able to stop the agent first and investigate immediately afterwards, Ulrich said. That investigation should establish what happened, identify weaknesses in controls and prevent the issue from happening again.

The security challenge posed by AI agents is not entirely unfamiliar. As agents act across more enterprise systems, however, controls sometimes viewed as standard IT hygiene will become far more important to maintain.

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