Visitors to the public websites of Zoom, Smartsheet, GitLab and several Salesforce properties were served attacker code on November 16 through Optimizely Web Experimentation, a marketing and testing tool those sites load from Optimizely's servers. At 11:20 a.m. UTC the Optimizely snippet on Zoom's website changed to pull in track.js, a file on a domain registered that morning, which the attacker reworked over the day to swap cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skim card numbers and try to load exploit kits on iPhones and iPads.
The work-platform vendors were among 178 organizations whose snippets carried the code, Scott Helme of security firm Report URI wrote in an analysis published the same day. Report URI counts 23 of them in technology and SaaS, which makes it the second-largest after banking and finance with 32 and ahead of retail and fashion with 20. The domains listed include zoom.us, gitlab.com, Smartsheet's help site and Salesforce's pardot.com. In each case the Optimizely script was altered and delivered to visitors, and neither Report URI nor Optimizely has said that any of those companies' own systems were breached.
Optimizely confirmed the incident in a status notice posted at 1:02 a.m. UTC on November 17.
Earlier today, Optimizely identified a security incident in which an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects.
The company said it has fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code and taken steps to secure affected user accounts, and it said on X that customers have been contacted directly.
How a trusted script carried the code
Each customer's site loads a JavaScript snippet holding Optimizely's code, the customer's experiments and an optional field called Project JavaScript, which runs on every page. Helme found that the attacker had written a loader into that field and left the rest untouched.
The file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com, with Optimizely's certificate, from a host that every affected site already trusted.
Helme wrote that the attacker's route into so many unrelated customer projects could be a compromised Optimizely system, a credential with cross-customer access or something else, adding, "That's for Optimizely to explain." Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned and then re-infected with a version that hid the malicious address in base64, which Helme said showed that whoever wrote the code still had access at the time.
What the payload did over the day
Report URI's timeline puts the first injection at 4:21 a.m. UTC and the card skimmer at 1:43 p.m. Cards entered in hosted payment frames from providers such as Stripe and Adyen were out of its reach, while cards typed into a site's own form fields were not. When the script swapped an address next to wallet or payment wording, it also sent the page's cookies that were not marked HttpOnly and a screenshot of the page.




