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NewsTrust & Risk40m · 16:06 GMT · 4 min read

Hijacked Optimizely Code Hit Zoom, Smartsheet, GitLab Sites

Zoom, Smartsheet, GitLab and Salesforce websites were among 178 that served attacker code through hijacked Optimizely Web Experimentation snippets on November 16. Optimizely says an attacker exploited a flaw it has fixed, and Salesforce says the scripts are now disabled on its sites.

An angled computer monitor showing lines of code, with the Optimizely logo

Visitors to the public websites of Zoom, Smartsheet, GitLab and several Salesforce properties were served attacker code on November 16 through Optimizely Web Experimentation, a marketing and testing tool those sites load from Optimizely's servers. At 11:20 a.m. UTC the Optimizely snippet on Zoom's website changed to pull in track.js, a file on a domain registered that morning, which the attacker reworked over the day to swap cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skim card numbers and try to load exploit kits on iPhones and iPads.

The work-platform vendors were among 178 organizations whose snippets carried the code, Scott Helme of security firm Report URI wrote in an analysis published the same day. Report URI counts 23 of them in technology and SaaS, which makes it the second-largest after banking and finance with 32 and ahead of retail and fashion with 20. The domains listed include zoom.us, gitlab.com, Smartsheet's help site and Salesforce's pardot.com. In each case the Optimizely script was altered and delivered to visitors, and neither Report URI nor Optimizely has said that any of those companies' own systems were breached.

Optimizely confirmed the incident in a status notice posted at 1:02 a.m. UTC on November 17.

Earlier today, Optimizely identified a security incident in which an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects.

The company said it has fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code and taken steps to secure affected user accounts, and it said on X that customers have been contacted directly.

How a trusted script carried the code

Each customer's site loads a JavaScript snippet holding Optimizely's code, the customer's experiments and an optional field called Project JavaScript, which runs on every page. Helme found that the attacker had written a loader into that field and left the rest untouched.

The file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com, with Optimizely's certificate, from a host that every affected site already trusted.

Helme wrote that the attacker's route into so many unrelated customer projects could be a compromised Optimizely system, a credential with cross-customer access or something else, adding, "That's for Optimizely to explain." Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned and then re-infected with a version that hid the malicious address in base64, which Helme said showed that whoever wrote the code still had access at the time.

What the payload did over the day

Report URI's timeline puts the first injection at 4:21 a.m. UTC and the card skimmer at 1:43 p.m. Cards entered in hosted payment frames from providers such as Stripe and Adyen were out of its reach, while cards typed into a site's own form fields were not. When the script swapped an address next to wallet or payment wording, it also sent the page's cookies that were not marked HttpOnly and a screenshot of the page.

On iPhones and iPads, according to Report URI, the script read the iOS version and tried to load an exploit chain in a hidden iframe, Coruna for iOS 13 to 17 and DarkSword for iOS 18, while the separate chain for iOS 26 currently only fingerprints the device. Helme reported that the kit's own comments describe iOS 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, as patched, and Report URI says it has no way to see how many iOS devices were infected.

By 7:25 p.m. UTC the attacker's wallets had received about $7,040, and Report URI said it cannot see how many cards, cookies or screenshots were taken. A mass cleanup ran from about 8:40 to 9:10 p.m., with Smartsheet's snippet cleaned at 8:56 p.m., and Report URI later said every infected file was clean by 11:11 p.m. Of the 1,611 snippets it checked, 188 belonging to 178 organizations were infected, and it expects the real number to be higher.

How the vendors have responded

Salesforce published a security advisory on its Trust site at 3:29 a.m. UTC on November 17, saying it is investigating unauthorized modifications to Optimizely scripts used on certain Salesforce websites.

As a precaution, Salesforce is confirming Optimizely scripts are disabled across preview and production instances.

As of 2:45 p.m. UTC on November 17, Zoom, Smartsheet and GitLab had not published statements on the incident on their status, trust or news pages or official X accounts.

The case follows the Fireworks AI incident UC Today reported on November 13, which exposed Notion AI chat transcripts. Report URI, which sells script-monitoring tools, found that 68 affected sites had no Content Security Policy and only 24, or 15% of those it evaluated, blocked the payload.

What the vendors have still to say

With the code delivered through a marketing and testing tool on their public websites, the open questions sit with Optimizely and the vendors whose pages loaded it. Optimizely's notice is still marked as monitoring, and the company has not explained how one vulnerability gave an attacker write access across unrelated customer projects.

Zoom, Smartsheet and GitLab have not said which of their pages carried the altered snippet or for how long, and Salesforce's investigation into whether customer data was accessed remains open. Those answers will show whether anyone who typed card details into a form on one of those pages, or opened one on an unpatched iPhone, has something to act on, and Salesforce has said it will notify affected customers without undue delay if it finds unauthorized access to their data.

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